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JURISDICTION
This Court granted Defendant's Petition for Permission To Appeal An
Interlocutory Order under Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 5(a) on August 20, 2008. (R.
V4, 1490).
ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Whether the production of non-party patient medical records ordered by the trial
court, without notice to or consent from the non-party patients, violates Utah's physicianpatient privilege statute?
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Discovery matters are ordinarily reviewed under an "abuse of discretion" standard,
but questions of law decided in the context of discovery will be reviewed for correctness.
Cannon v. Salt Lake Regional Med. Ctr., 121 P.3d 74, 76 (Ct. App. Utah 2005). Because
both the existence of a privilege and the application of constitutional protections are
questions of law, this Court should afford no deference to the district court's conclusions.
Burns v. Boydeny 133 P.3d 370, 374 (Utah 2006). Likewise, this Court reviews questions
of statutory interpretation for correctness, granting no deference to the district court's
decision. Carter v. University of Utah Medical Center, 150 P.3d 467, 469 (Utah 2006).

1

RELEVANT STATUTE
The Utah physician-patient privilege, which is embodied in Utah Rule of Evidence
506, states in relevant part:
(b) General Rule of Privilege. If the information is communicated in
confidence and for the purpose of diagnosing or treating the patient, a
patient has a privilege, during the patient's life, to refuse to disclose and to
prevent any other person from disclosing (1) diagnoses made, treatment
provided, or advice given, by a physician or mental health therapist, (2)
information obtained by examination of the patient, and (3) information
transmitted among a patient, a physician or mental health therapist, and
persons who are participating in the diagnosis or treatment under the
direction of the physician or mental health therapist, including guardians or
members of the patient's family who are present to further the interest of
the patient because they are reasonably necessary for the transmission of
the communications, or participation in the diagnosis and treatment under
the direction of the physician or mental health therapist.
(c) Who May Claim the Privilege. The privilege may be claimed by the
patient, or the guardian or conservator of the patient. The person who was
the physician or mental health therapist at the time of the communication is
presumed to have authority during the life of the patient to claim the
privilege on behalf of the patient.
(d) Exceptions. No privilege exists under this rule:
(1) Condition as Element of Claim or Defense. As to a
communication relevant to an issue of the physical, mental, or emotional
condition of the patient in any proceeding in which that condition is an
element of any claim or defense, or, after the patient's death, in any
proceedings in which any party relies upon the condition as an element of
the claim or defense;
(2) Hospitalization for Mental Illness. For communications relevant
to an issue in proceedings to hospitalize the patient for mental illness, if the
mental health therapist in the course of diagnosis or treatment has
determined that the patient is in need of hospitalization;
(3) Court Ordered Examination. For communications made in the
course of, and pertinent to the purpose of, a court-ordered examination of
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the physical, mental, or emotional condition of a patient, whether a party or
witness, unless the court in ordering the examination specifies otherwise."
(Utah R. Evid. 506(b) and (c))
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This

-neal from the "h la> 20 2008 Oi der : f tl 1 s tin: ial coi 11: t grantii lg Plaintiff

Denise Staley's Motion to Compel the production of the complete medical records of six
non-party patients who, in addition to Plaintiff, were assigned to Nurse Angela Stallings
during the night shift on Apr il 10, 2003 at St. Mark's Hospital ("St. Mark's").
Specifically, the trial court in its order found the following: (1) the Utah physician-patient
privilege, as codified

ie of Evidence 5H-- does not establish an absolute bar

against the disclosure of non-party patient records; (2) the disclosure of non-party
medical records is permitted if patient identifying information is redacted and a protective
oulu lidiifh the wope ol (hi/ di HJOSUK:, and, (<) HK: I'kunlill •

•

lui tin non-party

patient medical records in this case outweighs the privacy rights and expectations of the
non-party patients.
I Ni IIIIIC- ""' 'IIIIS Ml IM iii \ filed .1 Petition Ini I'nnnssinn lo Appi.'.il (lit1 Mw M),
2008 Interlocutory Order ("Petition") in this Court. On August 20, 2008, this Court
granted St. Mark's Petition. (R. V4, 1490).
S I ATEMENT OF FACT S
This is an action by Denise Staley ("Plaintiff) to recover for renal failure that she
suffered after undergoing a hysterectomy at St. Mark's on December 10, 2003

Her

null 11 inmpliunl I ill 11 uii Siplimhu IS, ?00fi, .ilky.ui Ihuil "it Mark's WAS negligent in
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that it failed to properly monitor Ms. Staley, timely notify Plaintiffs physician (Dr.
Jolles)1 of her symptoms of renal failure, and timely react in response to those symptoms.
(R. VI, 1-8).
On August 30, 2007, Plaintiff filed a Motion for leave to file a First Amended
Complaint and a Motion to Compel Production of Documents and Witnesses. (R. VI,
252-264).

Plaintiff was given leave to file a First Amended Complaint adding the

allegation that "St. Mark's was grossly understaffed and lacked adequate nurses and other
staff to provide safe and competent care to its patients," which constituted a knowing and
reckless indifference toward the safety of its patients entitling Plaintiff to an award of
punitive damages. (R. V2, 708). Plaintiffs Motion to Compel sought, in part, the
production of all documents which show the total patient count and reflect patient acuity
for Floor 4W on April 10, 11, and 12, 2003. (R. VI, 272).
St. Mark's objected to both motions (R. V2, 396-474), explaining that Floor 4W
does not keep documentation regarding patient acuity, and that the only way to
extrapolate such information would be to produce the medical files of each patient
staying on Floor 4W and attempt to develop an acuity assessment from those files. (R.
V2, 689-703). St. Mark's further explained that it had already produced the staffing
matrix, staffing sheet and patient census for Floor 4W on April 10, 2003. (R. V2, 730).
While these documents do not contain information concerning patient acuity, they detail
the number of patients receiving care, the number and staff providing care on the floor
1

The Order dismissing Dr. Jolles was entered on September 26, 2008.
Patient "acuity" refers to the amount of care and monitoring a patient needs for his or
her physical condition. (R. VI, 271).
2

4

that night, as well as the ratios of patients to staff that deiemrine stalling (m (lui iiiul ,nl
St. Mark's. More specifically, these documents detail that on the night in question there
were c inn / nurses 1 ,iiiul H patients on Floor 4W. (l

n

Of the 34

patients, 6 to 7 patients, including Ms. Staley, were cared I'm (n Nui v Stall m p during
different times throughout the night.
'\ffer lln 11 M »f i« MI . In.nil In ni 11111 s hue led, Hie district court, ordered St. Mark's to
"review the medical files of [Floor 4W] patients on April 111, I I, .mini I ,\ ,2003,, and, if
possible, to draw together data regarding patient acuity and produce a chart reflecting that
data." (I I \ % 689 703)

••

-

vplained that, {s]i ich production will not

invade the privacy of the other patients, but will provide the Plaintiff with the information
needed to assess whether the hospital was under-staffed on the dates in question." (R. V 2,
M<\) | lu, dislriel mm i JIKI pmvided I'l.ii «n (In1 e u u l ""^I I t a l k ' s is unable to provide an
"acuity chart," it "must produce a succinct statement, made under oath by an appropriate
person, concerning how acuity is assessed and communicated between staff on [Floor
4W]."(R.V2,695).
In response to the district court's order, How-Su Chen, the current manager of the
Floor A

i ;;K

Hospital, reviewed the medical records of the Floor 4W

patients on April 10, n and 11, 20IH .iiiul inmitlril .in .tlliilii il detitilftiii hoi findings.
(R. V3, 813-823). In her affidavit, Ms. Chen explained that staffing on Floor 4W was
detern lined based on a continuing evaluation of multiple factors, only one of which was a
3

According to the Staff Matrix for April 10, 2003, Nurse Nancy Emero's shift concluded
at 11:00 p.m. As a result, the patients assigned to her were then re-assigned to the
remaining six nurses on staff.
5

patient's acuity. (R. V3, 813-823). Ms. Chen also provided the court with a detailed
explanation of the acuity assessment process, setting forth the specific steps taken and
multiple considerations which determine staffing. (R. V3, 813-823.). Ms. Chen then
explained that any attempt to create an acuity chart for purposes of determining whether
staffing levels were appropriate, especially years after the fact, would necessarily be
"artificial and misleading" as it is impossible to recreate the exact circumstances and
considerations involved at the time those decisions were made solely from the patients'
medical records. (R. V3, 814). Nevertheless, because she was ordered to do so, Ms. Chen
attempted to evaluate the acuity of patients assigned to Nurse Angela Stallings on the
night shift of April 10-11 by reviewing their medical charts. Ms. Chen concluded that
"[w]hile it is impossible to recreate the specific factors that would have led to the
assignment of Ms. Stallings to those specific patients, the condition of those patients was
consistent with the expected patients on [Floor 4W]. Their assigmnent to Ms. Stallings
was an appropriate staffing level for a medical/surgical unit." (R. V3, 816).
Plaintiff subsequently requested the medical records of the six non-party patients
Nurse Angela Stallings cared for on April 10-11, 2003. On January 18, 2008, St. Mark's
filed an Objection to Discovery, arguing that disclosure of the non-party patient medical
records, without the non-party patients' knowledge or consent, even with all
identification information redacted, violated the Utah physician-patient privilege, and that
any information contained in these non-party medical records would be marginally
relevant, at best. (R. V3, 889-993).

6

On May 20, 2008, the Honorable Kate Toomey entered an order granting
Plaintiffs Motion to Compel and ordered the production of the complete medical records
of the six non-party patients with identifying information redacted. (R. V4, 1216-1237).
The trial court's ruling was made without notice to any of the non-party patients whose
records were ordered disclosed. (R. V4, 1216-1237).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The trial court's ruling is erroneous and should be reversed because (1) the plain
language of the Utah physician-patient privilege statute (Rule 506 of the Utah Rules of
Evidence) bars disclosure of non-party patient medical records without the knowledge or
consent of the patient; (2) Rule 506 provides no exception to permit disclosure based on
the redaction of identifying information, and this Court has not, and should not, create
such an exception where it was not provided by the Legislature and where the
effectiveness of redaction is pure speculation and effectively ignores the patients'
expectation of and right to privacy in their medical records; (3) St. Mark's has the right to
raise the privilege on its patients' behalf; and (4) the evidence Plaintiff seeks is irrelevant,
or at best marginally relevant, and is certainly not significant enough to eviscerate the
privacy rights of the six non-party patients for a purpose having little or no relevancy to
Plaintiffs malpractice action.
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ARGUMENT
I.

Utah's Physician-Patient Privilege Prohibits Disclosure Of The Nonparty Patient Medical Records Sought In This Case.
A. The Plain Language Of Utah's Physician-Patient Privilege
Statute Protects The Six Non-Party Patients' Hospital Medical
Records From Disclosure.

It is an undeniable truth that each of the non-party hospital medical records sought
in this case contains the very communications that are privileged and protected from
disclosure under Utah R. Evid. 506(b), i.e.:
"(1) diagnoses made, treatment provided, or advice given, by a physician or
mental health therapist, (2) information obtained by examination of the
patient, and (3) information transmitted among a patient, a physician or
mental health therapist, and persons who are participating in the diagnosis
or treatment under the direction of the physician or mental health therapist.

Utah R. Evid. 506(b). Hospital medical records, which contain information regarding
diagnosis and information obtained during an examination of a patient, clearly fall within
the scope and purpose of the privilege. See Tucson Medical Center Inc. v. Rowles, 520
P.2d 518, 520 (Ariz. App. 1974) (hospital records covered by the physician-patient
privilege); Pina v. Espinoza, 29 P.3d 1062, 1068-9 (N.M. Ct. App. 2001) (medical
records which contain communications between physician and patient are within
physician-patient privilege); Davis v. American Home Products Corp., 727 So.2d 647,
650 (La. Ct. App. 1999) (hospital medical records presumed to fall within scope of
physician-patient privilege); Newman v. Blom, 89 N.W.2d 349, 354 (Iowa 1958) (hospital
records necessarily fall within scope of physician-patient privilege because "although the
physician would not actually testify . . . the privileged matter sought to be barred would
8

in fact be effectually placed in evidence . . . . " ) ; Unick v. Kessler Memorial Hospital 257
A.2d 134, 136 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1969) ("To find that the written hospital records
sought by plaintiffs are not covered by the privilege, as an oral communication would
plainly be, would be to frustrate the intent of the Legislature in enacting a physicianpatient privilege in the first instance.").
As this Court stated recently in Sorensen v. Barbuto, 177 P.3d 614 (Utah 2008),
"[t]he healthcare fiduciary duty of confidentiality exists to foster appropriate medical
treatment of patients by assuring patients that their honest and complete disclosures of
symptoms and medical history to treating physicians will be kept confidential" Id. at 619
(emphasis added).

Obviously, this fundamental purpose of the physician-patient

privilege would be "rendered meaningless if it were destroyed the moment that a
physician transcribed communications from a patient or knowledge he has obtained from
his examination of a patient into hospital records." See, Tucson Medical Center Inc., 520
P.2dat521.
B. The Utah Physician-Patient Privilege In Utah Rule Of Evidence
506 Contains No Exception For Redaction Of The Patient's
Name From The Records Containing All Of Their Protected
And Confidential Information.
The trial court's order here effectively sanctions the abrogation of the
confidentiality protections of the physician-patient privilege, leaving in its wake a
privilege which now only entitles a non-party patient to the right to have their name
deleted before their intimate medical records are interjected into a civil lawsuit and
subjected to close inspection and analysis by complete strangers, all without the non-

9

party patients' knowledge or consent. Deletion of the non-party patients' names and
other identifying information does not avoid the statutory privilege. Indeed, the court's
production order will still give to another person those patients' "diagnoses made,
treatment provided, or advice given, by a physician or mental health therapist,"
"information obtained by examination of the patient," and "information transmitted
among a patient, a physician or mental health therapist, and persons who are participating
in the diagnosis or treatment" - the very information expressly protected by the privilege.
Utah R.Evid. 506(b).
None of the enumerated statutory exceptions apply here to permit the discovery of
redacted medical records. Utah R. Evid. 506 (d)(1), (2), or (3). As this Court held in
Burns v. Boyden, 133 P.3d 370, 377 (Utah 2006), the only exceptions to the physicianpatient privilege are limited to those "specifically enumerated" in Rule 506(d). When
applying the general rules of statutory construction, this Court has stated that its "primary
g o a l . . . is to evince 'the true intent and purpose of the Legislature [as expressed through]
the plain language of the Act,'" Carter v. University of Utah Medical Center, 150 P.3d
467, 469 (Utah 2006), by rendering "all parts [of the statute] relevant and meaningful"
and avoiding "interpretations that will render portions of a statute superfluous or
inoperative." Id.

This Court should "presume that the legislature used each word

advisedly and give effect to each term according to its ordinary and accepted meaning.
We must be guided by the law as it is . . . . When language is clear and unambiguous, it
must be held to mean what it expresses, and no room is left for construction." Zoll &
Branch, P.C v. Asay, 932 P.2d 592, 594 (Utah 1997). The maxim expression, unius est
10

exclusion alterius, the expression of one thing is the exclusion of another, supports the
view that the Legislature intended to limit the exceptions to those specifically
enumerated. See Field v. Boyer Co., L.C., 952 P.2d 1078, 1086-87 (Utah 1998); 2A
Norman J. Singer, Statutes and Statutory Construction §§ 47:23-25 (2000).
In Baker v. Oakwood Hospital Corp., 608 N.W.2d 823 (Mich. App. Ct. 2000), the
Michigan Appellate Court vacated the trial court's order compelling discovery of
redacted non-party patient records on the ground that, as here, the statute, as written, does
not make an exception for redacted medical records. Id. at 475. The Baker court
reasoned that "[w]hen statutory language is clear and unambiguous, we must honor the
legislative intent as clearly indicated in that language." Id.

This rationale squarely

applies to Rule 506 as interpreted in Burns. See also, CT. v. Johnson, 977 P.2d 479,
481 (Utah 1999) ("We presume that the legislature used each word advisedly and give
effect to each term according to its ordinary and accepted meaning.")(internal citations
omitted).
Thus, although the district court noted the "two major schools of thought"4 among
the several states as to whether redaction of a patient's name is sufficient to permit the
disclosure of the private and confidential information contained in that patient's medical
records, none of the cases permitting disclosure were interpreting Utah Rule of Evidence
506 and the "specific enumeration" requirement for exceptions to the Rule set forth in
Burns. Regardless of the rulings in other states on the issue, this Court should not create

4

For a compilation of the cases from sister states, see St. Mark's Petition for Permission
To Appeal, at pgs 5-6.
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a new exception to Rule 506 where the Utah Legislature has enumerated several specific
exceptions, none of which includes an exception permitting disclosure of redacted
medical records.
Moreover, not only does the production of redacted records violate the statute,
Plaintiff provided no evidence that redaction would actually protect the non-party
patients' privacy interests. As the courts barring disclosure of non-party patient medical
records have recognized, even if the names, addresses and phone numbers and other
"demographic" information is redacted, the information containing the history of the
patient's prior and present medical conditions, treatment and diagnoses could reasonably
be used to identify the individual and therefore, redaction does not adequately safeguard
their confidentiality. See Ekstrom v. Temple, 197 111. App. 3d 120 (2d Dist. 1990)
(deletion of patient identifying

information

may not sufficiently

protect the

confidentiality to which the non-party patients are entitled); Parkson v. Central DuPage
Hospital 105 111. App. 3d 850, 855 (1st Dist. 1982) ("Whether the patients' identities
would remain confidential by the exclusion of their names and identifying numbers is
questionable at best."); Wozniak v. Kombrink, 1991 WL 17213 (Ohio App. Ct. 1991)
(physician-patient privilege barred disclosure of non-party patient medical records, even
with identifying information redacted, because risk of disclosing a patient's identity could
not be entirely eliminated through redaction of identifying information).

12

C. St. Mark's Has The Right To Assert The Privilege On Its Nonparty Patients' Behalf.
Hospitals have standing to assert the physician-patient privilege on behalf of their
patients. See Tucson Medical Center Inc. v. Rowles, 520 P.2d 518, 523 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1974); Parkson v. Central DuPage Hospital 435 N.E.2d 140, 142 (111. App. Ct. 1982);
Unick v. Kessler Memorial Hospital 257 A.2d 134, 137 (N.J. Super Ct. Law Div. 1969)
Burns v. Boyden, 133 P.3d 370 (Utah 2006) is not to the contrary. In Burns, this
Court held that the plaintiff-physician in that case, charged with insurance fraud, was not
entitled to the presumption that he had authority to claim the physician-patient privilege
on behalf of his patients because clear evidence demonstrated that he was raising the
privilege, not to protect his patients, but rather to shield himself from a criminal
investigation. Burns, 133 P.3d at 379. This Court held it would not permit physicians "to
shield their fraud through the privilege" or to use their patients as "tools in perpetuating
the fraud," further noting that "it is doubtful that patients have any expectation that the
privilege would shield their records from law enforcement officials in a case like this."
Id
No such evidence and no such policy concerns are present here. St. Mark's is
raising the privilege on behalf of the non-party patients who have no notice of this
proceeding and are not present to raise it on their own behalf. Indeed, the evidence here
is that a failure to enforce the privilege could be helpful to St. Mark's defense. See
discussion of How-Su Chen's conclusions about patient acuity and staffing after the trial
court ordered her to review the non-party patient records, Statement of Facts, supra. Nor

13

is there any basis to conclude that any of the non-party patients would expect the private,
privileged and confidential information in their medical records to be revealed to
attorneys, parties, witnesses or juries in a medical malpractice case in which they are not
involved and about which they had no notice or knowledge. Nor is there any doubt that
Plaintiff seeks precisely such confidential and private information. In Plaintiffs Answer
to St. Mark's Petition for Permission to Appeal, Plaintiff specifically enumerates the
precise and detailed information that she seeks to obtain and use concerning each of these
non-party patients:
1. Admission history and physical;
2. Medication administration records for the Subject Shift and the prior shift;
3. Nursing notes for the Subject Shift and the prior shift;
4. Records of all physician consults conducted within 24 hours of the Subject
Shift; and
5. Discharge summaries.
(Plaintiffs' Answer to St. Mark's Petition for Permission to Appeal, at pg 6.)
Again these categories of information would necessarily contain the "diagnosis
made, treatment provided or advice given," and "information obtained by examination of
the patient," and "information transmitted among a patient, a physician or mental health
therapist, and persons who are participating in the diagnosis or treatment" - in other
words, the very matters protected by Rule 506(b).

14

II.

The Plaintiff Has Failed To Demonstrate That Her Need For NonParty Patient Medical Records Outweighs The Non-Party Patients'
Privacy Interests.

Plaintiff has urged that her need for the non-party records "far outweighs any
concerns regarding patient confidentiality." PL Ans. to St. Mark's Petition for Permission
to Appeal, at 15. But even assuming "need" were ever sufficient to overcome such a
fundamental privilege - and it should not be - this is not such a case. At the heart of
Plaintiffs request for the six non-party patient medical records is her mistaken belief that
without this information, she is unable to determine those patients' acuity levels, and
without an understanding of those patients' acuity levels, she is prevented from
evaluating whether "Angela Stallings had too many patients...." Id.
Plaintiffs purported need for the non-party patient medical records is misplaced
for three reasons:
•

First, because St. Mark's has admitted responsibility for the allegedly
negligent acts of its nurses, there is no legal basis or reason for Plaintiff to
assert a separate "negligent staffing" claim.

•

Second, whether Nurse Stallings was assigned too many patients is
irrelevant for purposes of establishing whether St. Mark's breached the
standard of care owed Plaintiff.

•

Third, even if Plaintiffs "negligent staffing" claim is not duplicative and
derivative of her negligence claim based on the acts/omissions of Nurse
Stallings, St. Mark's has already provided Plaintiff with the information
establishing staffing levels during the relevant period.
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A. Plaintiffs "Negligent Staffing" Claim Is Duplicative And
Unnecessary.
Plaintiffs claim that the non-party patient medical records are necessary to
evaluate whether Nurse Stallings was assigned too many patients is misplaced.

St.

Mark's has already admitted that Nurse Stallings is its agent/employee. Because St.
Mark's has already admitted its responsibility for the acts/omission of Nurse Stallings in
her care of Plaintiff, there is no basis for Plaintiffs "understaffing" claim against St.
Mark's. See Thompson v. Northeast III Reg. Commuter R.R. Corp., 854 N.E.2d 744 (1st
Dist. 2006) (if it is not disputed that the employee's negligence is to be imputed to the
employer under the doctrine of respondeat superior, then the cause of action for
corporate or institutional negligence is duplicative and unnecessary.

To allow both

causes of action to stand would allow the jury to assess or apportion the principal's
liability twice.).
The reason for this rule is apparent here. If Plaintiff fails to establish St. Mark's
nursing staff, including Nurse Stallings, was negligent in its care and treatment of
Plaintiff, her claim for negligent staffing will necessarily fail as well. See Garland
Community Hosp. v. Rose, 156 S.W.3d 541, 546 (Tex. 2004) (institutional negligence
claim against a hospital is "inextricably intertwined" with and "derives from" alleged
negligent treatment by physician, and thus "without negligent treatment, [an institutional
negligence] claim could not exist"); Taylor v. Cabell Huntington Hospital Inc., 538
S.E.2d 719, 725 (W.Va. 2000) ("While the appellant may be able to show that the
hospital breached its duty to supervise Nurse Grim, absent a showing of negligence by
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Nurse Grim, the appellant is unable to show that the hospital's negligence proximately
caused her injury."); Frigo v. Silver Cross Hosp. and Med. Ctr., 876 N.E.2d 697, 722 (1st
Dist. 2007) (citing cases for proposition that in an institutional negligence case if the
physician involved was not negligent, then the hospital's alleged negligence in issuing
him credentials "could not be a proximate cause of [plaintiffs] injuries"); Benedict v. St.
Luke's Hospitals, 365 N.W.2d 499, 504-05 (N.D. 1985) (trial court's failure to properly
instruct jury regarding hospital's liability for negligent staffing of its emergency room
was harmless error where the jury found that neither emergency room physician nor
plaintiffs personal physician, with whom he conferred, acted negligently); Beavis ex. rel
Beavis v. Campbell County Mem. Hosp., 20 P.3d 508, 515-16 (Wyo. 2001) (hospital was
not liable for negligent hiring of staff member who administered intramuscular injection
to minor patient, nor was physician liable for failing to train or supervise said staff
member, as jury found in separate trial that staff member was not negligent in
administering injection); Humana Medical Corporation of Alabama v. Traffanstedt, 597
So.2d 667, 669 (Ala. 1992) (verdict against hospital for negligent supervision of
physician who rendered treatment to plaintiff was inconsistent with verdict in favor of
physician).
In her Answer to St. Mark's Petition, Plaintiff cites Clover v. Snowbird Ski Resort\
808 P.2d 1037, 1048 (Utah 1991), in support of her claim that she is not precluded from
asserting her "negligent staffing" claim against St. Mark's. Plaintiffs reliance on Clover
is misplaced. In Clover, the defendant ski resort urged that one of its employees was not
acting within the course and scope of his employment at the time of a skiing accident
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wherein plaintiff was injured.

It was in this context that this Court stated that

"[rjegardless of whether an employer can be held vicariously liable for its employee's
actions under the doctrine of respondeat superior, an employer may be directly liable for
its own negligence in hiring and supervising employees."
The critical distinction between Clover and the instant case is that, unlike St.
Mark's, the ski resort denied respondeat superior responsibility for its employee's alleged
negligence. Thus, the plaintiff was still entitled to pursue a claim for negligent training
and supervision. In contrast, here St. Mark's has already admitted its respondeat superior
responsibility for the actions of its employees, including Nurse Stallings.

Thus, if

Plaintiff proves that Nurse Stallings was negligent in her monitoring and reporting of
Mrs. Staley's conditions, St. Mark's will admittedly be liable for that negligence.
Conversely, if Plaintiff fails to prove Nurse Stallings was negligent, her "negligent
staffing" claims would necessarily fail as well.

Certainly, such a duplicative and

unnecessary claim does not afford a proper basis to violate the physician-patient privilege
set forth in Rule 506.
B. The Non-Party Patient Medical Records Are Not Relevant To
Plaintiffs Underlying Negligence Claim.
Nor are the non-party patients' records relevant to Plaintiffs claims that Nurse
Stallings was negligent. St. Mark's has not claimed that Nurse Stallings was prevented
from attending to Plaintiff because she was too busy with other patients who were in
more serious condition.

Thus, the only relevant issue is whether Nurse Stallings'

monitoring and reporting of Plaintiffs condition fell within the standard of care. That
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determination does not require an examination of the intimate and personal medical
records of any non-party patients, but rather requires an examination of Plaintiffs own
medical records, the testimony of Nurse Stallings and others involved in Plaintiffs care
and expert testimony as to what the standard of care required. See e.g., Roe v. Planned
Parenthood Southwest Ohio Region, 878 N.E.2d 1061, 1068 (Ohio Ct. App. 2007) (nonparty patient medical records irrelevant to establish whether defendant violated Ohio law
in treatment of minor).
C. St. Mark's Has Already Produced An Abundance Of Evidence
Relevant To The Staffing Issue,
Even assuming arguendo that Plaintiffs belated negligent staffing allegations
properly allege a separate and cognizable cause of action - they do not - Plaintiff has
unfettered access to other evidence directly relating to the issue of staffing on 4W on
April 10, 2003 - including the charge reports, patient census information and staff matrix
previously provided to Plaintiff. These materials provide the clearest and most accurate
picture of staffing on April 10, 2003.

Therefore, Plaintiff already has the relevant

information necessary to accurately assess the nurse to patient ratio on the night in
question without impinging upon the privacy rights of any non-party patient, thereby
eviscerating any need for the production of non-party patient medical records.
A similar scenario occurred in Yoe v. Cleveland Clinic Foundation, 2003 WL
549923 (Ohio Ct. App. 2003). There, despite being provided with the Clinic's Operating
Room Schedule for the day in question, the plaintiffs sought production of non-party
patients' medical records in an effort to prove the defendant physician was operating on
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more than one patient simultaneously, thus breaching the standard of care owed to the
plaintiff. The Ohio Court of Appeals held that plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that their
need for the non-party patients' records outweighed the non-party patients' privacy
interests, and upheld the trial court's denial of their request. The court reasoned that the
plaintiffs had access to information in support of this theory of the case from sources
other than non-party patient medical records, as well as an opportunity to cross-examine
relevant witnesses regarding the defendant physician's whereabouts during the day in
questions. Ttf. at 3.
Like in Yoe, Plaintiff here has access to a myriad of information concerning the
staffing on 4W from many sources other than the non-party patients' medical records,
without impinging upon the non-party patients' privacy rights protected by Rule 506.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth herein, this Court should hold that the Utah physicianpatient privilege bars any disclosure of the contents of the six non-party patient medical
records at issue in this case.
Respectfully submitted,
HALL PRANGLE & SCHOONVELD, LLC

HXAQU
Onk of the atturnqys for Northern Utah
Healthcare Corp. d/b/a St. Mark's Hospital
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